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Featuref\rt~d~ I Evidence Corner 
A surprise: Montana's meptal health 
provider privileges, o~ lack thereof 
Last month's Evidence Corner, about the doctor-patient 
privilege, dealt with the protection of communications made by 
a patient to obtain physical health care. This month, I discuss 
the existence and limits of the corollary privilege for mental 
health practitioners. 
As with the doctor-patient privilege, Montana's state court 
privilege is different from the federal version. In both sys-
tems, communications made for mental health enjoy stronger 
privilege than doctor-patient communications. Surprisingly, 
however, Montana's privilege is far more limited than the federal 
psychotherapist privilege. It may be time for a statutory exten-
sion of the state's mental health privilege; for sure, Montana's 
social workers should advise their psychotherapy clients that 
their sessions are not covered by any evidentiary privilege. 
THE FEDERAL PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE 
Let's be clear: Justice Antonin Scalia doesn't need no stinkin' 
shrink. He apparently gets his counseling from his mother, or 
from his bartender, neither of whom is entitled to any sort of 
communications privilege, and that is good enough for him: 
When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapist 
came to play such an indispensable role in the 
maintenance of the citizenry's mental health? For most 
of history, men and women have worked out their 
difficulties by talking to, inter alias, parents, siblings, 
best friends, and bartenders - none of whom was 
awarded a privilege against testifying in court. 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 22, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1934, 135 
L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996) (Scalia, dissenting). 
Seven other members of the Court outvoted him, however, 
and the majority opinion in this case established a federal evi-
dentiary privilege for communications between a psychothera-
pist and a patient, pursuant to FRE SO l's injunction that federal 
privileges are to be determined by the federal courts, rather than 
by legislative or rule-making bodies. 1 Justice Stevens, writing for 
the Court, articulated the public policy in favor of protection of 
1 FRE 501, which I have discussed at more length in previous columns about 
other privileges, provides: 
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RULE 501. PRIVILEGE IN GENERAL 
The common law - as interpreted by United States courts in the light 
of reason and experience - governs a claim of privilege unless any of 
the following provides otherwise: 
the United States Constitution; 
a federal statute; or 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or de-
fense for which state law supplies the rule of decision. 
the disclosures made by a person seeking mental health services: 
... the question we address today is whether a privilege 
protecting confidential communications between a 
psychotherapist and her patient "promotes sufficiently 
important interests to outweigh the need for probative 
evidence .... " ... Both "reason and experience" persuade 
us that it does. 
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is "rooted in the 
imperative need for confidence and trust." Ibid. 
Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can 
often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical 
examination, objective information supplied by the 
patient, and the results of diagnostic tests. Effective 
psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an 
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient 
is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of 
facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the 
sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals 
consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential 
communications made during counseling sessions may 
cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the 
mere possibility of disclosure may impede development 
of the confidential relationship necessary for successful 
treatment. As the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee observed in 1972 when it recommended 
that Congress recognize a psychotherapist privilege 
as part of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, a 
psychiatrist's ability to help her patients 
"'is completely dependent upon [the patients'] 
willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes 
it difficult if not impossible for [a psychiatrist] to 
function without being able to assure ... patients of 
confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. 
Where there may be exceptions to this general rule .. ., 
there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua 
non for successful psychiatric treatment.' " Advisory 
Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 
183, 242 (1972) (quoting Group for Advancement 
of Psychiatry, Report No. 45, Confidentiality and 
Privileged Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry 
92 (June 1960)). 
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By prote Ling nfidential co~municat~ons between 
a psy hothernpist and her patient from mvol.untary 
dis losure, Lhe proposed privilege thus serves important 
private interests. 
Our cases make clear that an asserted privilege must 
also "serv[e] public ends." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 
584 (1981) .... The psychotherapist privilege serves 
the public interest by facilitating the provision of 
appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the 
effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental 
health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, 
is a public good of transcendent importance. 
In contrast to the significant public and private interests 
supporting recognition of the privilege, the likely 
evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of 
the privilege is modest. If the privilege were rejected, 
confidential conversations between psychotherapists 
and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly 
when it is obvious that the circumstances that give 
rise to the need for treatment will probably result in 
litigation. Without a privilege, much of the desirable 
evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek 
access - for example, admissions against interest by a 
party - is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken 
"evidence" will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking 
function than if it had been spoken and privileged. 
That it is appropriate for the federal courts to 
recognize a psychotherapist privilege under Rule 
501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the 
District of Columbia have enacted into law some form 
of psychotherapist privilege. (Citations and footnotes 
omitted) 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-12, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 
1928-29, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). 
Once the Jaffee majority had decided to recognize some form 
of psychotherapist privilege, its next task was to define the class 
of mental health professionals to whom the privilege would 
extend. The defendant-patient in the wrongful death case, Mary 
Lu Redmond, was a city police officer who, while on duty, shot 
and killed the plaintiffs decedent. After the incident, Officer 
Redmond participated in about 50 counseling sessions with a 
therapist employed by the city. That therapist was neither a 
psychiatrist nor a psychologist, but was a licensed clinical social 
worker. 
When the plaintiff tried to discover what Officer Redmond 
had said to social worker Breyer in their counseling sessions, 
both the patient and the therapist objected on grounds of 
privilege and refused both to provide the therapist's notes and 
to answer oral questions (or claimed that they could not recall 
what was said). The trial judge ordered disclosure, and when it 
did not come, informed the jury that there was no legal justifica-
tion for the claim of privilege and that the jury could assume the 
information would be unfavorable to Redmond. On appeal, the 
7t1i Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that such a privilege 
should exist. The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve the split 
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between the circuits. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the existence of the privilege, 
with regard not only to psychiatrists and psychologists but also 
to licensed clinical social workers: 
All agree that a psychotherapist privilege covers 
confidential communications made to licensed 
psychiatrists2 and p'sychologists. We have no hesitation 
in concluding in this case that the federal privilege 
should also extend to confidential communications 
made to licensed social workers in the course of 
psychotherapy. The reasons for recognizing a privilege 
for treatment by psychiatrists and psychologists apply 
with equal force to treatment by a clinical social worker 
such as Karen Beyer. Today, social workers provide 
a significant amount of mental health treatment. See, 
e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Center 
for Mental Health Services, Mental Health, United 
States, 1994, pp. 85-87, 107-114; Brief for National 
Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae 
5-7 (citing authorities). Their clients often include the 
poor and those of modest means who could not afford 
the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist, id., at 
6-7 (citing authorities), but whose counseling sessions 
serve the same public goals. Perhaps in recognition 
of these circumstances, the vast majority of States 
explicitly extend a testimonial privilege to licensed 
social workers.'7 We therefore agree with the Court 
of Appeals that "[d]rawing a distinction between the 
counseling provided by costly psychotherapists and the 
counseling provided by more readily accessible social 
workers serves no discernible public purpose." 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-17, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931-
32, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). 
As you would expect, Justice Scalia vehemently - and enter-
tainingly - disagreed: 
I must observe that the Court makes its task deceptively 
simple by the manner in which it proceeds. It begins by 
characterizing the issue as "whether it is appropriate for 
federal courts to recognize a 'psychotherapist privilege,' 
" ante, at 1925, and devotes almost all of its opinion 
to that question. Having answered that question (to 
its satisfaction) in the affirmative, it then devotes less 
than a page of text to answering in the affirmative the 
small remaining question whether "the federal privilege 
should also extend to confidential communications 
made to licensed social workers in the course of 
psychotherapy,'' ante, at 1931. 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 20, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1933, 135 
L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). Justice Scalia's dissent devotes substan-
tially more room to the difference between psychiatrists and 
psychologists on the one hand and social workers on the other, 
concluding that if there is going to be some sort of psychothera-
pist privilege, it should be restricted to the former: 
2 Remember that there is no doctor-patient privilege in federal court, so that the 
only protection for disclosures to a psychiatrist M.D. is through this psychothera-
pist privilege. Where the doctor-patient privilege is recognized, a psychiatrist's 
sessions should fit under that umbrella. [Ford, not Supreme Court, footnote] 
Page 9 
• 
A licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is an expert 
in psychotherapy- and that may suffice (though I 
think it not so clear that this Court should make the 
judgment) to justify the use of extraordinary means 
to encourage counseling with him, as opposed to 
counseling with one's rabbi, minister, family, or friends. 
One must presume that a social worker does not bring 
this greatly heightened degree of skill to bear, which is 
alone a reason for not encouraging that consultation as 
generously. Does a social worker bring to bear at least 
ft significantly heightened degree of skill-more than 
a minister or rabbi, for example? I have no idea, and 
neither does the Court .... 
With due respect, it does not seem to me that any 
of this [social work] training is comparable in its 
rigor (or indeed in the precision of its subject) to the 
training of the other experts (lawyers) to whom this 
Court has accorded a privilege, or even of the experts 
(psychiatrists and psychologists) to whom the Advisory 
Committee and this Court proposed extension of a 
privilege in 1972. Of course these are only Illinois' 
requirements for "social workers." Those of other 
States, for all we know, may be even less demanding. 
Indeed, I am not even sure there is a nationally accepted 
definition of "social worker," as there is of psychiatrist 
and psychologist. It seems to me quite irresponsible to 
extend the so-called "psychotherapist privilege" to all 
licensed social workers, nationwide, without exploring 
these issues. 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 29-30, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1938, 
135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). 
Justice Scalia garnered only one vote, so his position went 
down 7-2. Jaffee remains the law in federal court, meaning 
that in federal criminal and non-state-law civil cases,3 there is 
an absolute privilege for communications by a patient/client to 
her psychotherapist, whether she has selected a psychiatrist4, 
psychologist, or licenseds social worker to fill that role. 
MONTANA: PSYCHOLOGISTS ONLY? 
As you will recall from earlier columns, Montana takes 
the opposite approach to creation of privilege. In our state, 
evidentiary privileges are restricted to those identified by the 
Legislature in Title 26 of the Montana Code Annotated. M.C.A. 
26-1-8076 provides such a privilege for some, but not all, mental 
health professionals: 
26-1-807. Psychologist-client privilege. The 
confidential relations and communications between a 
psychologist and a client must be placed on the same 
3 See last month's column, expanding on the discussion of the last sentence of 
FRE 501: "But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or de-
fense for which state law supplies the rule of decision:' 
4 There is no doctor-patient privilege in federal court (see last month), so psy-
chiatrists have to be covered by the psychotherapist privilege or not at all. 
5 Justice Scalia observes a difference between "licensed social worker" and "li-
censed clinical social worker;' but the majority opinion specifically uses the less 
restrictive phrase. 
6 This statute was enacted in 1971, and its only amendment was in 2009, as part 
of a gender-neutralizing rewrite of a number of statutes. 
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basis as provided by law for those between an attorney 
and a client. Nothing in any act of the Legislature may 
be construed to require the privileged communications 
to be disclosed. (Emphasis supplied) 
Thus, Montana is included in Justice Stevens' list of"all 50 
States and the District of~olumbia [which] have enacted into 
law some form of the psychotherapist privilege." Jaffee, 518 U.S. 
at 12. The Court then includes Montana in its list of states that 
extend that privilege to social workers, but (shockingly?) the 
M.C.A. doirs not support that proposition, as I explain below. 
A. Psychologists are definitely protected by Montana 
statute 
M.C.A. 26-1-807, in both its title and text, is limited to 
psychologists. The statute itself does not define "psychologist" 
but M.C.A. Title 37, "Professions and Occupations," Chapter 17, 
"Psychologists," states: 
(4) (a) "Practice of psychology" means the observation, 
description, interpretation, and modification of human 
behavior by the application of psychological principles, 
methods, and procedures for the purpose of eliminating 
symptomatic, maladaptive, or undesired behavior 
and improving interpersonal relations, work and life 
adjustment, personal effectiveness, and mental health. 
(b) The practice of psychology includes but is not 
limited to psychological testing and evaluation 
or assessment of personal characteristics such as 
intelligence, personality, abilities, interests, aptitudes, 
and neuropsychological functioning; counseling, 
psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, hypnosis, biofeedback, 
and behavior analysis and therapy; diagnosis and 
treatment of mental and emotional disorders or 
disabilities, chemical dependency, substance abuse, and 
the psychological aspects of physical illness, accident, 
injury, or disability; and psychoeducational evaluation, 
therapy, remediation, and consultation. 
(5) A person represents to the public that the person 
is a "psychologist" when the person uses a title or 
description of services incorporating the words 
"psychologist," "psychological," "psychologic," 
or "psychology" and offers to render or renders 
psychological services described in subsection (4) 
to individuals, groups, corporations, or the public, 
whether or not the person does so for compensation or 
fee. 
M.C.A. 37-17-101. M.C.A. 37-17-301 requires psychologists 
to be licensed; 37-17-302 sets forth the requirements for licen-
sure, which include a doctoral degree in psychology, an exami-
nation, and a minimum of two years of supervised experience in 
the practice of psychology. 
Thus, a person who is a licensed psychologist in the state of 
Montana can guarantee to his clients that their communications 
are both subject to a duty of confidentiality7 and privileged from 
disclosure by M.C.A. 26-1-807. The Montana Supreme Court 
7 This ethical duty is expressed in APA Ethical Standard 4.05, Disclosures. 
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recognized this privilege and applied it to a sex abuse victim's 
psychological records in State v. Duffy, 300 Mont. 381, 6 P.3d 
453 (2000).8 In State v. Reynolds, the rape defendant sought 
inspection of the victim's mental health records, including those 
from her psychiatrist and psychologist. The Court ruled: 
We further hold that the medical records pertaining to 
the victim's psychotherapeutic treatment are protected 
from disclosure by various recognized testimonial 
privileges which outweigh the defendant's purported 
need for or limited right to such information in the 
hands of a non-adversary third party. Section 26-1-807, 
MCA, provides an unqualified privilege for confidential 
communications between a psychologist and client. The 
District Court acted properly in denying defendant's 
motion to obtain access to Dr. Sievert's, Sandi Burns' 
and Dr. Newman's records pertaining to Janey Doe. 
State v. Reynolds, 243 Mont. 1, 8, 792 P .2d 1111, 1115 ( 1990). 
More recently, in a non-citable 2009 opinion, the Court affirmed 
the denial of defendant's request for the mental health records 
of a non-victim witness for the State, citing both the patient's 
constitutional and statutory rights to privacy as well as M.C.A. 
26-1-807. State v. Miller, 352 Mont. 553, 218 P.3d 500, 2009 MT 
314N. 
8 This case does recognize the competing right of a criminal defendant to discov-
ery of exculpatory information, and assigned to the trial judge the duty of in cam-
era inspection of the records to ensure that only those which truly are exculpatory 
are turned over to the defense. Thus, Q..yfu does provide a way around the privi-
lege in some criminal cases, despite the absolute language of the privilege statute. 
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Note that in order lo obtain the pr te tion M.C.A. 26-
1-807, I here must b a psycho] gist- lient r ationsbip. Wh n 
the psy hoJogisl is employ d by th ·opp nenl, this relati nship 
and thu · ti i privil g do not exist, although the party may have 
other protections. Thomas Park was charged with homicide and 
forgery, and indicated that he intended to call mental health care 
providers at trial to support his affirmative defense of extreme 
mental or emotional stress. The State then sought to have its 
own expert examine Park for rebuttal purposes, pursuant to 
M.C.A. 46-14-212. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
order for such an examination, but laid out restrictions on such 
an examination and resulting testimony. Neither the Court nor 
the defendant made any reference to the psychologist privilege, 
relying instead on the defendant's constitutional rights against 
self-incrimination: 
'" 35 First and foremost, we recognize that if a 
defendant>s privilege not to incriminate himself is to 
have any force, it must mean that he can decide with 
whom and in what terms he discusses such potentially 
incriminating matters as the events surrounding the 
charges against him. Further, a defendant's right 
to remain silent applies at all stages of a criminal 
proceeding ... . Therefore, a defendant clearly carries the 
privilege with him into a psychological examination 
with the State's expert. . .. 
The mere fact that a defendant wishes to introduce 
Evidence, page 27 
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psychological testimony and therefore must cooperate 
during an examination so that the State has the 
opportunity to rebut his expert testimony is insufficient 
to constitute a complete waiver of his right to remain 
silent. Accordingly, we conclude that a defendant has 
a constitutional right to remain silent when asked 
by the State's psychological expert about the events 
surrounding the alleged offense. 
37 It does not follow, however, that a defendant's right 
to remain silent when questioned by the State's expert 
about the alleged offense should afford an opportunity 
to place unrebuttable testimony before the jury .... 
We reverse that part of the District Court's order 
that compels Park to answer questions during the 
examination regarding the alleged offense, but hold 
that ifhe refuses to answer those inquiries by the State's 
expert, and also remains silent at trial, he may not offer 
that evidence through his expert. 
Park v. Montana Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Park Cnty., 1998 
MT 164, 289 Mont. 367, 376-378, 961P.2d1267, 1272-74. See 
also, State v. Van Dyken, 242 Mont. 415, 791P.2d1350 (1990). 
The privilege prevents testimony and documentary evidence 
about the psychologist-client relationship from being admitted 
at trial. However, like other statutory privileges, it does not ap-
ply to sentencing proceedings: 
~ 31 We have previously stated that "the rules of 
evidence are not applicable or controlling in sentencing 
hearings." State v. Race (1997), 285 Mont. 177, 180, 946 
P.2d 641, 643 (citation omitted). A sentencing court 
is allowed "to have the fullest information possible 
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics, so 
that the court is able to individualize punishment." 
Race, 285 Mont. at 180, 946 P.2d at 643. Thus, a 
statement that is covered by the psychotherapist-
patient privilege may be inadmissible at trial but is 
admissible at a sentencing hearing. Race, 285 Mont. at 
180-81, 946 P.2d at 643. (Emphasis supplied) 
State v. J.C., 2004 MT 75, 320 Mont. 411, 419, 87 P.3d 501, 
507. 
The psychologist privilege applies in trial cases in Montana 
state courts, both criminal and civil. Furthermore, because 
psychologists are included in the psychotherapist privilege in 
federal court established by Jaffee, the psychologist's privilege 
does not depend on the court system. Therefore, the psy-
chologists' privilege is broader than Montana's doctor-patient 
privilege in both respects. I would have no compunction about 
revealing the most difficult information (so long as it does not 
involve a potential future harm) to a psychologist, confident in 
its immunity from forced disclosure.9 
9 The same caveat about waiver of this privilege in civil cases pursuant to 
M.R.Civ.P. 35 applies as to waiver of the doctor-patient privilege. See last month's 
column on doctor-patient privilege. 
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B. Psychiatrists are covered by the doctor-patient statute 
Psychiatrists are not psychologists, and so are not covered by 
Montana's psychologist privilege, if that statute is strictly con-
strued. What is the difference? I turned to that trusty source, 
W ebMD, for an explanation: 
What's the difference between a psychologist and a 
psychiatrist? · 
That may sound like a setup for a knee-slapper, but it's 
actually a good question, and many people don't know 
the full answer. It's not as simple as who tends to what, 
like the difference between a goatherd and shepherd. 
Both kinds of professionals treat people with problems 
that vary widely by degree and type, from mild anxiety 
to schizophrenia. Both can practice psychotherapy, and 
both can do research. 
The short answer is, psychiatrists are medical doctors 
and psychologists are not. The suffix "-iatry" means 
"medical treatment," and "-logy" means "science" or 
"theory." So psychiatry is the medical treatment of the 
psyche, and psychology is the science of the psyche. 10 
Because they are doctors, Montana's psychiatrists are cov-
ered under the doctor-patient privilege statute, although as we 
saw last month, that privilege applies only in civil cases. Thus, a 
criminal defendant who consults a psychiatrist for mental health 
treatment has no valid privilege to prevent disclosure of what he 
said to his psychiatrist, whereas communications to a psycholo-
gist are clearly privileged in both civil and criminal cases. This 
seems be counter-intuitive: seeking mental health treatment 
from an M.D. yields less privilege than using a psychologist, but 
that is the current status of Montana law. In federal court, un-
der Jaffee, psychologists and psychiatrists are treated identically. 
C. Social workers are NOT covered by privilege, although 
they have a statutory duty of confidentiality 
What about licensed social workers who provide mental 
health services? Again, in federal court under Jaffee, as much 
as Justice Scalia may dislike it, these mental health professionals 
have the same privilege as psychiatrists and psychologists. 
In Montana, the statutory answer is that social workers are 
not "psychologists" so the privilege extended by MCA 26-1-807 
does not cover them, nor does any other statute in the privilege 
section of the Montana Code Annotated, Title 26 Chapter 1. 
Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court included Montana 
in its list of states that "explicitly extend" a privilege for dis-
closures to licensed social workers, citing M.C.A. 37-22-401. 
11 That statute is located in Title 37, entitled "Professions and 
Occupation," Chapter 22 of which deals with "Social Work." 
Part 4 deals with regulations for social workers. The specific 
statute provides: 
37-22-401. Privileged communications - exceptions 
A licensee may not disclose any information the 
licensee acquires from clients consulting the licensee in 
a professional capacity except: 
1 O http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/features/psychology-vs-psychiatry-
which-is-better, last accessed 9/4/2014. 
11 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 17, fn. 17. 
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(1) with the written consent of the client or, in the 
case of the client's death or mental incapacity, with the 
written consent of the client's personal representative or 
guardian; 
(2) that the licensee need not treat as confidential a 
communication otherwise confidential that reveals the 
contemplation of a crime by the client or any other 
person or that in the licensee's professional opinion 
reveals a threat of imminent harm to the client or others; 
(3) that if the client is a minor and information acquired 
by the licensee indicates that the client was the victim of 
a crime, the licensee may be required to testify fully in 
relation to the information in any investigation, trial, or 
other legal proceeding in which the commission of that 
crime is the subject of inquiry; 
( 4) that if the client or the client's personal 
representative or guardian brings an action against a 
licensee for a claim arising out of the social worker-
client relationship, the client is considered to have 
waived any privilege; 
(5) to the extent that the privilege is otherwise waived by 
the client; and 
(6) as may otherwise be required by law. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
This statute has not been substantively changed since its 
enactment in 1983, and there are no Montana cases construing 
or applying it. In fact, W estlaw research revealed only two cases 
nationwide citing this statute, Jaffee being one.12 
With all due respect, I think that Justice Stevens over-relied 
(or under-analyzed) Montana state law in support of his conclu-
sion that licensed clinical social workers were entitled to share 
in the psychotherapist privilege. The Montana Supreme Court 
is the final arbiter of evidence law in our state courts, and it 
is bound by the plain language of the statutes enacted by the 
Montana Legislature. The Legislature clearly limits privileged 
relationships to those specified in Title 26, Chapter 1: 
26-1-801. Policy to protect confidentiality in certain 
relations. There are particular relations in which it 
is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and 
to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be 
examined as a witness in the cases enumerated in this 
part. (Emphasis added) 
Psychologists are enumerated in this part; social workers, 
licensed or not, are not. 
The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the 
legislative intent to limit privileges to those specified by statute. 
12 The other is from a federal court in the Southern District of Alabama in 2002, 
which analyzed the list provided in Jaffee to divide states on that list into those 
which do and do not require licensure of the social worker for recognition of the 
privilege. Jane Student 1 v. Williams. 206 F.R.D. 306 (S.D. Ala., 2002) (concluding 
that that the federal psychotherapist privilege does not extend to unlicensed so-
cial workers or unlicensed professional counselors). 
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For instance: 
16 Initially, we observe that testimonial privileges 
must be strictly construed because they contravene 
the fundamental principle that the public has the right 
to everyone's evidence. See MacKinnon, "21 (citing 
Trammel v. Unit~d States (1980), 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 
S.ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186, 195). 
State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 238, 989 
P.2d 304, 307. "While serving these underlying policy goals, the 
[attol'ney-client] privilege must be construed narrowly because 
it obstructs the truth-finding process." Am._Zurich Ins. Co. v. 
Montana Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 2012 MT 61, 364 Mont. 
299, 303, 280 P.3d 240, 245. Justice Warner, joined by Justice 
Rice, observed in another context (venue) "it is not for this Court 
to add to what has been omitted to a statute." Maupin v. Meadow 
Park Manor, 2005 MT 304, 329 Mont. 413, 416, 125 P.3d 611, 
614. 
It is true that the words "privilege" and "social worker" do 
appear together in a statute, but that statute is not located in Title 
26 Chapter 1, Part 8, and so is not "enumerated in this part" as 
required by M.C.A. 26-1-801. Moreover, the exception to the 
"privilege" in M.C.A. 37-22-401, stated as subpart 6, specifically 
requires a social worker to disclose confidential information "as 
may otherwise be required by law." A judge requiring disclosure 
of the communications in a court proceeding (through discovery 
or at trial), would certainly be "required by law." My best reading 
of the social worker statute is that it sets forth a statutory duty of 
confidentiality, but does not create an evidentiary privilege. 
There is one Montana Supreme Court case that implicitly 
affirms disclosure of a social worker's records while protecting 
those of a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, without any refer-
ence at all to M.C.A. 37-22-401, although it had been enacted 
seven years earlier. In State v. Reynolds, supra, the young adopted 
daughter who was allegedly raped by her father, spent some time 
at a mental health facility in Billings after she was removed from 
the home. There, she was treated by a team of mental health care 
providers, including a psychiatrist, a psychotherapist13, and a so-
cial worker (Rochelle Beley). The defendant wanted access to all 
these records, but as discussed above, the trial court and Supreme 
Court both held that the psychiatrist and psychotherapist records 
were privileged: 
We further hold that the medical records pertaining to 
the victim's psychotherapeutic treatment are protected 
from disclosure by various recognized testimonial 
privileges which outweigh the defendant's purported 
need for or limited right to such information in the 
hands of a non-adversary third party. Section 26-1-807, 
MCA, provides an unqualified privilege for confidential 
communications between a psychologist and client. The 
District Court acted properly in denying defendant's 
motion to obtain access to Dr. Sievert's, Sandi Burns' 
and Dr. Newman's records pertaining to Janey Doe. 
13 The case never defines the exact qualifications of this "psychotherapist" and it 
is not clear if in fact the patient or the prosecutor asserted the psychologist privi-
lege: "The prosecutor also agreed to ask psychotherapist Sandi Burns to bring her 
records for a similar in camera inspection, but defense counsel made no further 
request for inspection:' 243 Mont. at 7. 
October 2014 
tate v. Reynolds, 243 Mont. 1, 8, 792 P.2d 1111, 11 lS (1990) 
Howeve~, with ut any critical comment, the Court also ob erved 
that the Judge had allowed ·the defense to access to th soda! 
worker's records: 
The files of Rochelle Beley, including any reports therein 
from Rivendell and Billings Deacones Hospital" 2-
North .Psychiatric Unit, w re subjected to an in camera 
inspection by defense counsel. 
While allowing an inspection ofR chelle Beley's :file, th 
District ourt denied motions as to all othe1-record . ... 
243 Mont. at 7, 792 P.2d at lll5 (1990). Presumably, no one 
in the case made any claim to privilege for a social worker, and 
the Court certainly did not blink at the disclosure of her records. 
Reynolds' conviction was affirmed. 
The primary reason that the U.S. Supreme Court extended 
the privilege to licensed social workers in Jaffee was the Court's 
reasoning that the many Americans receive their mental health 
treatment from the most numerous, and least expensive, provid-
ers: social workers. Justice Scalia's dissent questioned the truth of 
this proposition, and argued that such a decision was better left 
to the legislative branch. In Montana, where privileges are purely 
statutory, the Legislature has not yet been convinced to take such 
McGrath, from page 19 
University Law School, he served as a Reginald Heber Smith 
Community Lawyer Fellow in Reno, Nevada, providing legal 
services to low-income clients. 
And as chief justice, Krueger said, McGrath has fought to 
promote and establish self-help centers throughout Montana, 
, r ts do not have any privilege for their 
a step. Social workers c ien 'f the clients or their providers 
. . I do not know 1 
commumcatlons. h ch is that b th side a -
f h. 't ation but my un are aware o t 1s s1 u ' 'ali is all th y need. Tl ~snot. 
sume that the duty of confident! ty 
CONCLUSION 
Th 
. . .. 1• ·n both civil and criminal proceed-ere 1s a clear pnv1 ege 1 . . , ·b 
. . t for commumcations etween a psy-
mgs m Montana state cour s l · · 
h l . . C munications between a psyc 1iatnst c o og1st and a patient. om · u· t " ile 
. . d d r the doctor-pa .en pnv ge, and a patient are privilege un e . . , .. 
h. h 1. . . il b . t t criiutoal cases, because a psychi.i-w 1c app 1es in c1v u no . d 1· d 
t . t . d C . ti'ons between a clJ.ent an a icense ns 1s a octor. ommumca . 
. 1 k h ld b k t confidential by the social worker per soc1a wor er s ou e ep . . 
th t t t l t. th profession but are likely to be subJect e s a u es regu a mg e ' di d · 
to disclosure in both civil and criminal court procee ngs esp1te 
an objection of "privilege." 
The Legislature should clarify the status of the ment.al health 
privilege, and if it concludes that social workers are entitle~ ~o 
a privilege, expand M.C.A. 26-1-807 to include li~en~ed chmcal 
social workers as well as psychologists and p~yc~1atnsts. In the 
meantime, Montanans who wish to keep their disclosures to a 
mental health practitioner privileged should go to psychologists, 
and not to either psychiatrists or social workers. 
and he has made continued funding of self-help centers and 
pro bono services among his top priorities. 
"ChiefJustice Mike McGrath deserves to be recognized for 
improving access to the judicial system and a distinguished 
legal career that has demonstrated not only a personal commit-
ment and dedication, but also excellence in the development of 
practices to expand and impact the delivery oflegal services to 
the unrepresented Montana population," Krueger said. 
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